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QUAESTIONES MEDII AEVI NOVAE (2013)
BRUCE M.S. CAMPBELL
BELFAST
NATIONAL INCOMES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE: 
INSIGHTS FROM RECENT RESEARCH*
The capacity of pre-industrial European economies to resist 
the Malthusian tendency for increases in national income to 
be absorbed by further expansion of population and, instead, 
generate  and  sustain  improved  material  well  being  and  real 
per capita economic growth remains a matt er of considerable 
debate.  Gregory  Clark,  for  instance,  believes  that  Malthusian  relationships 
remained paramount until right up to the industrial revolution, as evidenced 
by the fact that 15th century levels of real wage rates and his own consumption-
based estimate of English per capita GDP were not signifi cantly bett ered until 
late in the 19th century1. R.C. Allen takes a more optimistic view and claims 
that  relatively  high  real  wage  rates  paid  in  England  and  its  immediately 
neighbouring  North  Sea  economies  spurred  investment  in  labour-serving 
technology and human capital formation, culminating in adoption of the raft 
*  This paper derives from the project Reconstructing the National Incomes of Britain 
and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 1850, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Reference Number 
F/00215AR. It is also informed by the Collaborative Project Historical Patt erns of Development 
and  Underdevelopment:  Origins  and  Persistence  of  the  Great  Divergence  (HI-POD),  supported 
by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme for Research, Contract Number 
SSH7-CT-2008-225342. I am grateful to Stephen Broadberry, Mark Overton, and Jan Luiten 
van Zanden for research collaboration and to Bas van Leeuwen and Alex Klein for research 
assistance. Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Jacob Weisdorf both kindly supplied data. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the conference Que reste-t-il des crises? Deux 
journées  avec  Guy  Bois,  Université  Paris Diderot  –  Paris  7,  2012,  and  the  seminar  Economic 
and  Social  History  of  the  Pre-modern  World,  1500-1800  at  the  Institute  of  Historical  Research, 
London 2013.
1  This view is most fully articulated in G. Clark, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic 
History of the World, Princeton 2008.
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of innovations associated with the industrial revolution2. For this privileged 
minority  of  economies,  take  oﬀ   to  sustained  economic  growth  was  thus 
preceded by a long era of economic dynamism and structural change when 
Malthusian pressures were mostly kept in abeyance and Smithian processes 
of commercial expansion and specialisation were to the fore. 
Estimates of English per capita GDP by Crafts and Harley from 1700, 
largely corroborated and extended back to the 13th century by Broadberry, 
Campbell, Klein, van Leeuwen and Overton, endorse this more optimistic 
view3. Between 1500 and 1750 England’s population grew from 2.2 million 
to 7.3 million and, on the latt ers’ estimates, its per capita GDP improved 
from  $1,135  to  $1,680.  Other  countries  which  successfully  reconciled 
modest improvements in per capita wealth and prosperity with sustained 
demographic expansion include Holland during its early modern “Golden 
Age” (Table 3) and Italy during the 12th and 13th century commercial 
revolution  (Table 4).  In  each  case,  Smithian  trade-based  specialisation, 
Ricardian  investment  in  improved  institutions  and  new  technology,  and 
Boserupian intensifi cation of land-use delivered enhanced returns to land, 
labour  and  capital.  Rising  urbanisation  levels  provide  one  of  the  clearest 
symptoms  of  the  real  economic  progress  thereby  achieved,  as  secondary 
and tertiary activities grew in importance and economic structures became 
more complex and diﬀ erentiated4. 
Pre-industrial rates of economic growth were always modest, invariably 
less than 1 percent and typically well below 0.5 percent per annum, and prone 
to falter and decline5. Nevertheless, from the 15th century they were suﬃ  cient 
to generate a widening divergence within Europe between the leading and 
lagging  economies  and  their  respective  capacities  to  resist  the  negative 
2  R.C.Allen, The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the 
First World War, “Explorations in Economic History” XXXVIII (2001) 4, pp. 411-447; idem, 
The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cambridge 2009.
3  N.F.R.  Crafts,  C.K.  Harley,  Output  Growth  and  the  British  Industrial  Revolution: 
A Restatement of the Crafts Harley View, “Economic History Review” LXV (2008) 4, pp. 703-730; 
S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton, B. van Leeuwen, British Economic 
Growth 1270-1870, London School of Economics, Working Paper, London 2011.
4  E.A.  Wrigley,  Urban  Growth  and  Agricultural  Change:  England  and  the  Continent 
in the Early Modern Period, “Journal of Interdisciplinary History” XV (1985) 4, pp. 683-728; 
J.L. van Zanden, Early Modern Economic Growth: A Survey of the European Economy, 1500-1800, 
in: Early Modern Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in Europe, 1400-1800, ed. by M. Prak, 
London 2001, pp. 69-87 (“regional diﬀ erences in levels of development [...] are perhaps best 
approached via variations in the urbanization ratio”).
5  K.G.  Persson,  Pre-industrial  Economic  Growth:  Social  Organization  and  Technological 
Progress in Europe, Oxford 1988, pp. 124-142; J.L. van Zanden, B. van Leeuwen, Persistent But 
Not Consistent: The Growth of National Income in Holland 1347-1807, “Explorations in Economic 
History” IL (2012) 2, pp. 119-130; S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton, 
B. van Leeuwen, op.cit.
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consequences of population growth and achieve higher average levels of 
per capita material wellbeing. Both economic groups contained signifi cant 
numbers of poor households living at a bare-bones level of subsistence, 
but with the diﬀ erence that as per capita GDP slowly rose in the leading 
economies, so the proportion of such households gradually diminished 
and provision grew of institutionalised welfare intended to sustain them 
through hard times6. In England Malthusian positive checks to population 
growth had consequently been more-or-less eliminated well before advent 
of the industrial revolution7. 
PER CAPITA GDP
Discussion of pre-industrial rates of economic growth and the wealth and 
poverty  of  nations  ultimately  hinges  upon  eﬀ ective  estimation  of  national 
income, population, and, thence, per capita GDP. Angus Maddison’s per 
capita GDP estimates for a range of European countries in 1850 provide 
a reasonably secure benchmark against which levels of development in 
earlier centuries may be judged. At that time per capita GDP ranged from 
less than $1,000 (Geary-Khamis 1990 PPP International dollars) in poor and 
relatively under-developed European economies such as Finland, Norway, 
Greece and Portugal, to a maximum of over $2,300 in the leading economies 
of Great Britain and the Netherlands, and averaged approximately $1,600 
in  Western  Europe  as  a  whole8.  Maddison  has  also  oﬀ ered  a  range  of 
estimates for earlier centuries, extending as far back as the Roman Empire, 
but  methodologically  these  are  less  robust  and  his  estimates  for  countries 
since subject to close empirical examination have all turned out to be too 
low9. By implication, therefore, gains in per capita GDP between 1000 and 
1850 were substantially smaller than those estimated by Maddison and rates 
6  S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton, B. van Leeuwen, op.cit. 
7  B.M.S.  Campbell,  Four  Famines  and  a  Pestilence:  Harvest,  Price,  and  Wage  Variations 
in England, 13th to 19th Centuries, in: Agrarhistoria på många sätt ; 28 studier om manniskan och 
jorden. Festskrift till Janken Myrdal på hans 60-årsdag, ed. by B. Liljewall, I.A. Flygare, U. Lange, 
L. Ljunggren, J. Söderberg, Stockholm 2009, pp. 23-56; B.M.S. Campbell, C.Ó. Gráda, Harvest 
Shortfalls, Grain Prices, and Famines in Pre-industrial England, “Journal of Economic History” 
LXXI (2011) 4, pp. 859-886; M. Kelly, C.Ó. Gráda, The Poor Law of Old England: Institutional 
Innovation  and  Demographic  Regimes,  “Journal  of  Interdisciplinary  History”  XLI  (2010)  3, 
pp. 339-366.
8  A.  Maddison,  Statistics  on  World  Population,  GDP  and  per  capita  GDP  1-2008  A.D., 
Groningen 2009, (htt p://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm); for updated estimates see 
htt p://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm.
9  His  estimates  for  Italy  ($1,100),  the  Netherlands  ($761),  France  ($727),  the  United 
Kingdom ($714), Germany ($688), and Spain ($661) in 1500 are on average 40 percent lower 
than the re-estimates given in Table 1.
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of economic growth slower, which lends support to stagnationist verdicts 
on the period10. Exceptions nevertheless existed and the transformation of 
fi rst Holland and then England from lagging to leading economies, with per 
capita GDPs which more than doubled over the 400 years between the eves 
of the Black Death and industrial revolution, demonstrates that cumulative 
growth could and did occur (Graphs 8 and 10). 
Historical national incomes may be estimated by totalling the value 
of incomes, expenditure or net output, with results from each method of 
estimation providing a crosscheck on the others. Further, net output can either 
be measured directly (from data on agriculture, mining and manufacturing, 
and services and valued using data on prices) or inferred indirectly from data 
on population size, wage rates and estimated levels of urbanisation (on the 
principles that domestic food production was proportionate to the population 
to be fed and non-agricultural output proportionate to the non-agricultural, 
i.e. urban, population). Rigorous methodologies exist for deriving estimates 
in these alternative ways and thereby making best use of available empirical 
data11. For England from 1253 and Holland from 1348 directly estimated 
output-based per capita GDP series are now available on an annual basis 
(Graphs 8 and 10) and are complemented by equivalent output series 
estimated indirectly for Spain from 1277 and Italy from 1310 (Graphs 6 and 7). 
Additional indirect estimates have been derived for selected European 
countries for a range of benchmark dates (Table 1).
Table 1: Per capita GDP and urbanisation ratios for selected European countries and 
benchmark dates.
1300 1400 1500 1600 Mean 1400, 
1500, 1600
A) Per capita GDP (Geary-Khamis 1990 PPP International dollars):
Holland $1,264 $1,461 $2,448 $1,724
Italy $1,650 $1,682 $1,544 $1,302 $1,509
10  Italy  is  the  clearest  example  of  long-term  stagnation  and  decline:  P.  Malanima, 
The Long Decline of a Leading Economy: GDP in Central and Northern Italy, 1300-1913, “European 
Review of Economic History” XV (2011) 2, pp. 169-219. Sweden, in contrast, existed in a state 
of dynamic equilibrium from the 1560s to 1860s, with signifi cant structural economic change 
essentially no improvement in per capita GDP: L. Schön, O. Krantz , The Swedish Economy in the 
Early Modern Period: Constructing Historical National Accounts, “European Review of Economic 
History” XVI (2012) 4, pp. 538-541.
11  C.H. Feinstein, National Statistics, 1760-1920: Sources and Methods of Estimation for 
Domestic Reproducible Fixed Assets, Stocks and Works in Progress, Overseas Assets, and Land, 
in:  Studies  in  Capital  Formation  in  the  United  Kingdom,  1750-1920,  ed.  by  C.H.  Feinstein, 
S. Pollard, Oxford 1988, pp. 257-471. 
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France $1,300 $1,244 $1,244 $1,263
Germany $1,385 $989 $1,187
England $760 $1,251 $1,136 $1,093 $1,160
Spain $1,046 $989 $1,018 $1,074 $1,027
Sweden $847
B) Urbanisation ratio (%):
Netherlands 13.8 21.7 29.5 34.7 28.6
Italy 21.4 17.6 21.0 18.4 19.0
France 8.0 10.8 8.8 10.8 10.1
Germany 7.9 11.1 8.2 8.5 9.3
UK 4.4 5.7 4.6 7.9 6.1
Spain 8.8 7.8 c.8.0 14.5 10.1
Sweden c.2.0
Sources: (A) Per capita GDP – Holland and England: S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, M. Overton, 
J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National Incomes of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 1850, research 
project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Reference Number F/00215AR. (N.D.); Italy: P. Malanima, Italian 
GDP 1300-1913, Institute of Studies on Mediterranean Societies, Italian National Research Council (N.D.); 
Netherlands; France, Germany and Spain: C. Álvarez-Nogal, L. Prados de la Escosura, The Rise and Fall 
of Spain (1270-1850), “Economic History Review” LXVI L (2013) 1, p. 23; Sweden: L. Schön, O. Krantz , 
The Swedish Economy in the Early Modern Period: Constructing Historical National Accounts, “European Review 
of Economic History” XVI (2012) 4, p. 546; (B) Urbanisation ratio – Italy: P. Malanima, loc.cit.; Spain: 
C. Álvarez-Nogal and L. Prados de la Escosura, op.cit., p. 14; Netherlands, France, Germany and UK: 
P. Bairoch, J. Batou, P. Chevre, The Population of European Cities from 800 to 1850, Geneva 1988; Sweden: 
L. Schön, O. Krantz , op.cit., p. 540.
Generally, the wealthier and more developed an economy the higher its 
urbanisation ratio, since urban growth was contingent upon production of 
agricultural surpluses and expansion of demand for manufactured goods 
and services. Deviations did nonetheless occur, when per capita GDP rose 
but urbanisation ratios did not, as, most strikingly, following the Black Death 
when  the  contraction  of  populations  exceeded  the  shrinkage  of  national 
incomes  and  crowded  urban  populations  were  hit  hard  by  plague.  This 
raises the intriguing question whether per capita GDP growth under such 
negative circumstances and without increasing urbanisation amounted to 
real economic growth at all. The fact that per capita GDP improved by less 
than real wage rates, and sometimes even declined, also suggests that the 
impression of 15th century prosperity and growth implied by labourers’ real 
wage rates may be an illusion. Certainly, as Luis Angeles has shown, changes 
in relative factor prices, the length of the working day and year, and the 
labour-force participation rates of men, women and children might all raise 
or depress real wage rates relative to per capita GDP12. Much is therefore to 
12  L. Angeles, GDP per capita or Real Wages? Making Sense of Confl icting Views on Pre-
-industrial Europe, “Explorations in Economic History” XLV (2008) 2, pp. 147-163.
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be gained by considering real wage-rates, urbanisation, and per capita GDP 
trends comparatively, especially when, as in the case of England, each has 
been estimated independently of the others.
REAL WAGE RATES
Quantitative historical analysis of absolute and relative levels of economic 
development  prior  to  the  industrial  revolution  eﬀ ectively  commenced 
with  publication  in  1956  of  Henry  Phelps-Brown  and  Sheila  Hopkins’ 
celebrated  chronology  of  the  real  wage  rates  of  English  building  labourers, 
reconstructed from data on wages and prices gathered during the previous 
100 years by J.E. Thorold Rogers and William Lord Beveridge13. Since then, 
real wage-rate series for technologically unvarying tasks such as building 
and farm labouring have been widely employed to draw inferences about 
the direction, magnitude and character of economic change. For instance, 
Allen has recently used building workers’ real wage-rate series for 19 cities 
to investigate the widening divergence in the relative cost of labour between 
the countries of the North Sea region and the rest of Europe over the course 
of the early modern period14. Where unit labour costs were highest, as in the 
cities of the southern North Sea region, incentives to invest capital in labour-
-saving technology were strongest. Comparisons between wages and prices 
in Europe and Asia point in the same direction15.
English real wage-rate series are chronologically the longest and most 
robust currently available. As recently corrected and revised by John H. Munro, 
the Phelps-Brown and Hopkins chronology of English building workers’ 
real wage rates runs continuously for seven centuries from 1264 (Graph 1). 
A corresponding chronology of farm labourers’ real wage rates compiled 
by Clark commences even earlier, in 1209, but remains discontinuous until 
1268 (Graph 2). Both series yield closely comparable chronologies, with the 
prominent exception of the immediate aftermath of the Black Death of 1348-
13  E.H. Phelps-Brown, S.V. Hopkins, Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables, Compared 
with Builders’ Wage Rates, “Economica”, new series, XXIII (1956) 92, pp. 296-314, reprinted 
in A Perspective of Prices and Wages, London-New York 1981; J.E. Thorold Rogers, A History 
of Agriculture and Prices in England from 1259 to 1793, I-VI, Oxford 1866-1902; W.H. (Lord) 
Beveridge, L. Liepmann, Prices and Wages in England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century, 
I, London 1939.
14  R.C. Allen, The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages 
to the First World War, “Explorations in Economic History” XXXVIII (2001) 4, pp. 411-447; 
R.C. Allen, Data: Wages and Price History, htt p://www.nuﬃ  eld.ox.ac.uk/People/sites/Allen/
SitePages/Biography.aspx.
15  S.N.  Broadberry,  B.  Gupta,  The  Early  Modern  Great  Divergence:  Wages,  Prices  and 
Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500-1800, “Economic History Review” LIX (2006) 
1, pp. 2-31. 
NATIONAL INCOMES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE... 173
Graph  1:  John  H.  Munro’s  re-working  of  the  Henry  Phelps  Brown  and  Sheila 
Hopkins index of English building labourers’ real wage rates.
Sources: E.H. Phelps-Brown, S.V. Hopkins, Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables, Compared with 
Builders’ Wage Rates, “Economica”, new series, XXIII (1956) 92, pp. 296-314; J.H. Munro, The Phelps Brown 
and Hopkins ‘Basket of Consumables’ Commodity Price Series and Craftsmen’s Wage Series, 1264-1700: rev. by 
John H. Munro’, htt p://www.economics.utoronto.ca/munro5/ResearchData.html.
Graph 2: English building labourers’ and farm labourers’ indexed real wage rates.
Sources: Graph 1 and G. Clark, The Long March of History: Farm Wages, Population, and Economic Growth, 
England 1209-1869, “Economic History Review” LX (2006) 1, pp. 130-134.
BRUCE M.S. CAMPBELL174
-1349, when the labour of scarce farm workers rose to a premium but demand 
for building labourers slumped as most construction work was suspended16. 
Following  this  initial  period  of  readjustment  and  during  the  prolonged 
demographic decline and stagnation that followed the Black Death, real 
wage rates of urban and rural labourers both rose to levels that would not 
be bett ered until the closing decades of the 19th century (Graph 2). These 
peak late-medieval wage rates are one of the most remarkable features of the 
Phelps-Brown and Hopkins chronology and have now been confi rmed as 
a general phenomenon, showing up in Italy, Spain, Holland and most cities 
across  Europe  (Graph  3).  Whether  they  are  symptomatic  of  acute  labour 
scarcity or genuine economic growth nevertheless remains an issue.
Graph 3: Building labourers’ real wages: England, Spain, North-Central Italy, 
Amsterdam, Paris and Strasbourg.
Sources:  England:  Graph  2;  Spain:  data  supplied  by  L.  Prados  de  la  Escosura;  Italy:  G.  Federico, 
P. Malanima, Progress, Decline, Growth: Product and Productivity in Italian Agriculture, 1000-2000, “Economic 
History Review” LVII (2004) 3, pp. 459-460; Amsterdam-Paris-Strasbourg: R.C. Allen, Data: Wages and 
Price History: htt p://www.nuﬃ  eld.ox.ac.uk/People/sites/Allen/SitePages/Biography.aspx.
Equally  striking  is  the  inverse  correlation  that  existed  between  real 
wage rates and population trends (Graphs 4 and 8), as reconstructed in 
great detail for England from the country’s unrivalled late medieval and 
early modern manorial, parochial and tax records. The clear tendency for 
16  J.H.Munro, Before and after the Black Death: Money, Prices, and Wages in Fourteenth-
-century England, in: New Approaches to the History of Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: 
Selected Proceedings of Two International Conferences at The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and 
Lett ers in Copenhagen in 1997 and 1999, ed. by T. Dahlerup, P. Ingesman, Copenhagen 2009, 
pp. 335-364.
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real wage rates to decline during periods of population growth during 
the 13th, 16th, 18th centuries, sink to their nadir at times of extreme harvest 
failure and acute demographic pressure, as in 1316, 1597 and 1801 (Graphs 1 
and 2), and then recover when numbers declined or ceased to grow, notably 
from 1350  to 1450 and 1650 to 1750, has naturally lent itself to pessimistic 
Malthusian  interpretations  of  pre-industrial  economic  development17. 
Income-based  estimates  of  per  capita  GDP  derived  in  part  from,  and 
dominated by, these real wage rates naturally suggest a similar conclusion18. 
If  real  wage  rates  are  taken  as  a  guide,  Ricardian  diminishing  returns  to 
labour seemingly prevailed and were not reversed until industrialising and 
modernising processes were well advanced, with the result that unskilled 
workers did not begin to benefi t from sustained gains in purchasing power 
until well into the 19th century19 In Italy, too, a similarly inverse relationship 
prevailed between labourers’ real wage rates and population trends from the 
fourteenth to the early 19th centuries (Graphs 5 and 7) but with the critical 
diﬀ erence that over these fi ve centuries the Italian manufacturing sector was 
contracting  and  urbanisation  ratios  falling,  as  this  once  leading  economy 
steadily declined20.
Wage rates of a single occupational cohort of workers least exposed to 
technological change are nevertheless an imperfect proxy for estimates of 
per capita national income and were themselves a function of changes in 
the relative price of labour and the length of the working day and year. 
From the mid 18th century as labourers almost everywhere began to work 
more industriously, thereby increasing the per capita supply of labour, real 
wage  rates  in  Spain,  Italy,  England  and  Holland  declined  relative  to  per 
capita GDP (Graphs 6, 7, 8 and 10)21. Farm labourers needed to work longer 
in order to maintain their living standards, while urban labourers did so in 
order to acquire some of the new cheap consumer goods (Graph 9). Workers 
in the new factories also found themselves subjected to a much tougher 
work discipline22. Conversely, during the labour-scarce 15th century many 
17  J. Hatcher, M. Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages: The History and Theory of England’s 
Economic Development, Oxford 2001, pp. 21-65.
18  G. Clark, The Macroeconomic Aggregates for England, 1209-1869, “Research in Economic 
History” XXVII (2010), pp. 51-140. 
19  G. Clark, The Condition of the Working-class in England, 1209-2004, “Journal of Political 
Economy” CXIII (2005), pp. 1307-1340.
20  P.  Malanima,  Wages,  Productivity  and  Working  Time  in  Italy,  1270-1913,  “Journal  of 
European Economic History” XXXVI (2007) 1, pp. 127-171; idem, The Long Decline of a Leading 
Economy: GDP in Central and Northern Italy, 1300-1913, “European Review of Economic History” 
XV (2011) 2, pp. 169-219.
21  L. Angeles, op.cit., pp. 153-159. 
22  H.J. Voth, The Longest Years: New Estimates of Labor Input in England, 1760-1830, “Journal 
of Economic History” LXI (2001) 4, pp. 1065-1082.
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Graph 4: Mean annual growth rates of English population, labourers’ real wage 
rates and per capita GDP.
Sources: S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, M. Overton, J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National 
Incomes of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 1850, research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 
Reference Number F/00215AR; Graph 2. 
Graph 5: Mean annual growth rates of Italian population, labourers’ real wage rates 
and per capita GDP.
Sources: P. Malanima, Italian GDP 1300-1913, Institute of Studies on Mediterranean Societies, Italian 
National Research Council (N.D.); G. Federico, P. Malanima, Progress, Decline, Growth: Product and 
Productivity in Italian Agriculture, 1000-2000, “Economic History Review” LVII (2004) 3, pp. 459-460.
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workers found that with the high real wage rates then prevailing (Graphs 1, 
2 and 3) they could satisfy their basic subsistence requirements with fewer 
days of paid work per year (Graph 9). Rather than work more industriously 
in order to acquire more material goods, most building workers and their 
rural counterparts found that the drudgery of much manual work made 
greater consumption of leisure the more att ractive option23. This further 
reinforced  the  contraction  in  labour  supply  and  upward  pressure  upon 
labourers’ wage rates. Because of these changes in relative factor prices and 
in the number of days that labourers needed or wished to work per year, 
signifi cant divergences sometimes occurred between the trajectories of real 
wage rates and per capita GDP (Graphs 6, 7, 8 and 10). 
URBANISATION RATIOS
Urbanisation ratios (the proportion of the population resident in towns of 
a given minimum size) provide a useful alternative proxy measure of overall 
levels  of  economic  development,  on  the  principle,  enunciated  by  Simon 
Kuznets, that urbanisation represents “an increasing division of labour within 
the country, growing specialisation, and the shift of many activities from non-
market-oriented pursuit within the family or the village to specialised market-
-oriented business fi rms”24. Other things being equal, therefore, “a rising 
level of real income per head and a rising proportion of urban dwellers are 
likely to be linked phenomena in a pre-industrial economy”25. 
In  England,  where  per  capita  GDP  and  urbanisation  ratios  have  been 
separately  estimated,  a  clear  correlation  existed  between  the  two:  the 
correlation  coeﬃ  cient  for  per  capita  GDP  against  the  percentage  resident 
in towns of at least 5,000 inhabitants for seven benchmark dates between 
1290 and 1801 is a strongly positive +0.96. In tandem with an increase in per 
capita GDP from $680 to $2,140 and rise in the urbanisation ratio from 5 to 
28 percent, the structure of the English economy changed from one in which 
agriculture contributed at least two-thirds of all output and employment 
to one in which manufacturing and services together accounted for over 
23  I. Blanchard, Introduction, in: Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective, Thirteenth 
to Twentieth Centuries: Papers Presented at Session B-3a of the Eleventh International Economic 
History Congress, Milan 12th-17th September 1994, ed. by I. Blanchard, Stutt gart 1994, pp. 19-22; 
R.C. Allen, J.L. Weisdorf, Was There an ‘Industrious Revolution’ before the Industrial Revolution? 
An Empirical Exercise for England, c. 1300-1830, “Economic History Review” LXIV (2011) 3, 
pp. 715-729.
24  S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, New Haven 1966, 
p. 271.
25  E.A.  Wrigley,  Urban  Growth  and  Agricultural  Change:  England  and  the  Continent…, 
p. 683.
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two-thirds of both output and the labour force26. Export earnings also made 
an  increasing  contribution  to  national  income,  doubling  in  value  from 
approximately an eighth of national income at the opening of the 14th century 
to  a  quarter  of  national  income  at  the  beginning  of  the  19th  century  and 
exceeding a third of national income during the mercantilist boom years of 
the mid 18th century27. 
Table 2: Measures of economic change in England 1600-1750.
ENGLAND 1600 1670 1700 1750 Annual 
% change 
1600-1750
Total population 4.11m. 4.98m. 5.06m. 5.77m. +0.23%
London population 200,000 475,000 575,000 675,000 +0.81%
% in towns of 5,000+ 8.25% 13.5% 17.0% 21.0% +0.62%
Exports as % GDP 13.2% *9.5% 22.0% 37.5% +0.70%
Agricultural output 100 106 130 171 +0.36%
Manufacturing output 100 149 204 259 +0.64%
Real wage rates 100 122 132 166 +0.34%
GDP per capita $1990 $1,058 $1,244 $1,608 $1,757 +0.34%
* 1660
Sources: E.A. Wrigley, Urban Growth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early Modern 
Period,  “Journal  of  Interdisciplinary  History”  XV  (1985),  p.  688;  S.N.  Broadberry,  B.M.S.  Campbell, 
M. Overton, J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National Incomes of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 
1850, research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Reference Number F/00215AR.
In England’s case, expanding domestic and overseas demand were plainly 
fundamental to the processes of economic growth and urban and metropolitan 
expansion. Well before the industrial revolution had begun to get under way, 
the dramatic rise in the urbanisation ratio from 8 percent in 1600 to 21 percent 
in 1750 and parallel growth of London from a population of 200,000 to one of 
675,000, are clear manifestations of the Smithian gains then being obtained 
from trade (Table 2). Development of what Wrigley has termed an advanced 
organic economy enabled agriculture to keep abreast of the expanding 
demands for food, fuel and raw materials and Victoria Bateman has drawn 
att ention to the greater integration of internal English grain markets that was 
26  S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, B. van Leeuwen, When Did Britain Industrialise? 
The  Sectoral  Distribution  of  the  Labour  Force  and  Labour  Productivity  in  Britain,  1381-1851, 
“Explorations in Economic History” L (2013) 1, pp. 16-27.
27  I am grateful to Bas van Leeuwen for making these estimates.
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integral to the same process28. After 1750 building workers’ real wage rates 
turned down once again (Graph 8) but the momentum of economic growth 
continued, as borne out by continued shrinkage of the share of the labour 
force employed in agriculture and a further rise in the urbanisation ratio to 
27.5 percent by 180029.
Table 3: Measures of economic change in Holland 1500-1650.
HOLLAND 1500 1550 1600 1650 Annual 
% change 
1500-1650
Total population 273,000 350,000 503,000 796,000 +0.72%
Amsterdam population 14,000 30,000 65,000 175,000 +1.70%
% in towns of 5,000+ 45% 45%
Exports as % GDP 21% 27% 38% 25% +0.12%
Agricultural output 100 148 167 250 +0.61%
Real wage rates 100 82 81 69 -0.25%
GDP per capita $1990 $1,461 $1,685 £2,448 $2,399 +0.33%
Sources: S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, M. Overton, J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National 
Incomes of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 1850, research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 
Reference Number F/00215AR; J. de Vries, European Urbanization 1500-1800, London 1984, p. 171; J.-L van 
Zanden, B. van Leeuwen, Persistent But Not Consistent: The Growth of National Income in Holland 1347-1807, 
“Explorations in Economic History” IL (2012) 2, pp. 119-130.
The Netherlands, during the Dutch Golden Age 1500-1650 (Table 3), 
illustrates  a  similar  synergy  between  commerce,  urbanisation  and  what 
J.L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen describe as “persistent but not consistent” 
economic  growth30.  Over  almost  two  centuries  of  sustained  “Smithian” 
expansion, Dutch per capita GDP doubled from $1,100 to $2,490 and the 
already impressive urbanisation ratio of the Netherlands rose from 22 percent 
to 35 percent (Table 1). Greater market integration, expansion of international 
trade  and  shipping  and  rapid  structural  change  were  key  features  of  the 
growth of Dutch national income and accompanying rise of the urbanisation 
ratio  to  hitherto  unprecedented  levels  for  pre-industrial  Europe31.  In  the 
28  E.A. Wrigley, The Transition to an Advanced Organic Economy: Half a Millennium of 
English  Agriculture,  “Economic  History  Review”  LIX  (2006) 3,  pp.  435-480;  V.N.  Bateman, 
The Evolution of Markets in Early Modern Europe, 1350-1800: A Study of Wheat Prices, “Economic 
History Review” LXIV (2011) 2, p. 464.
29  S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, B. van Leeuwen, op.cit., pp. 16-27; E.A. Wrigley, 
Urban Growth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent…, pp. 688.
30  J.-L van Zanden, B. van Leeuwen, op.cit., pp. 119-130.
31  On  the  growing  integration  of  Dutch  grain  markets  see  V.N.  Bateman,  op.cit., 
pp. 462-463.
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process, Amsterdam grew from insignifi cance to become a major maritime 
metropolis of 175,000 inhabitants. Contrary to these positive developments, 
Amsterdam building labourers’ real wage rates trended down over this same 
period in a clear illustration of the divergent course sometimes taken by 
real wage rates and per capita GDP (Graph 10), as employment conditions 
changed and the profi ts of economic growth were shared unequally among 
occupational groups. 
By  implication,  countries  with  lower  urbanisation  ratios  were  less 
developed and correspondingly poorer. By 1600 P. Bairoch, J. Batou and 
P. Chevre reckon that the Netherlands’ urbanisation ratio was treble the 
European average of 12 percent, which only the Balkans, Portugal, Italy and 
Flanders also clearly exceeded32. At the opposite extreme, urbanisation ratios 
in most of east-central and northern Europe were substantially lower and in 
Scandinavia sank to a European minimum of less than 4 percent. Signifi cantly, 
an independent estimate by Lennart Schön and Olle Krantz  reckons Swedish 
per capita GDP in 1600 to have been $847 (Table 1), barely a third that 
of Holland’s $2,448 and two-thirds that of Italy’s $1,302, which until the 
beginning of the 16th century had been the most urbanised and developed 
economy in Europe with an urbanisation ratio of around 20 percent and per 
capita GDP in the range $1,500-$1,900. Yet even in poor and weakly urbanised 
Sweden estimated urbanisation ratios and per capita GDP yield essentially 
similar trends, “even if variation is within narrow margins”33.
Italy’s economic golden age had been in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries, 
when it had reaped maximum gains from what Robert Lopez has justifi ably 
called  the  “commercial  revolution”34.  Its  many  self-governing  urban 
communes,  led  by  the  maritime  republics  of  Genoa  and  Venice,  prospered 
on  the  re-expansion  of  Mediterranean  commerce  and  new  opportunities 
for trans-Alpine trade promoted by the Champagne Fairs operated under 
the  politically  neutral  jurisdiction  of  the  quasi-independent  counts  of 
Champagne35. Commercial privileges in the Middle East secured following 
the unexpected success of the First Crusade gave access to lucrative Levantine 
markets and a growing volume of high-value Asian trade goods reaching the 
crusader ports of the eastern Mediterranean across the Syrian desert from 
32  P. Bairoch, J. Batou, P. Chevre, The Population of European Cities from 800 to 1850, 
Geneva 1988, p. 259.
33  L.  Schön,  O.  Krantz ,  The  Swedish  Economy  in  the  Early  Modern  Period:  Constructing 
Historical National Accounts, “European Review of Economic History” XVI (2012) 4, p. 540.
34  R.S. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350, Cambridge 1976; 
J.R.S. Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe, Oxford 1988, pp. 201-121.
35  J.L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, Oxford 
1989, pp. 102-134; J. Edwards, S. Ogilvie, What Lessons for Economic Development Can We Draw 
from the Champagne Fairs?, “Explorations in Economic History” IL (2012) 2, pp. 131-148.
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Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. Further commercial gains were made when 
Venice won direct access to the Black Sea in 1204, to be superseded by Genoa 
from 1261. Genoa was 13th-century Italy’s most successful maritime city-state 
and over the course of that century, as the value of its long-distance trade 
grew rapidly, its population more than doubled36. 
Paolo Malanima’s estimates imply that the population of the centre and 
north of Italy grew by an average of 0.3 percent per annum between 1000 and 
1300 and per capita GDP by 0.2 percent over the same period. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of the population resident in towns of at least 5,000 inhabitants 
more than doubled from 5-12 percent to 21.4 percent and the country’s per 
capita GDP peaked at a hitherto unprecedented $1,700 (Table 4). By the close 
of the 13th century Italian cities accounted for almost a third of Europe’s urban 
population and 24 of the continent’s 103 largest cities with populations of at 
least 20,00037. The country’s high urbanisation ratio (rivalled at the time solely 
by that of Flanders, its major but much smaller trading partner in northern 
Europe) is thus symptomatic of its place in the vanguard of contemporary 
commercial developments.
Table 4: Measures of economic change in Italy 1000-1300.
ITALY (CENTRE-NORTH) 1000 1300
Population c.3.20m. c.7.75m.
Density per km2 20 48
% urban (towns of 5,000+) 5-12 21.4
GDP per capita (1990 $) c.$1,000 c.$1,640
Population growth rate 0.3% per annum
Economic growth rate 0.2% per annum
Sources: P. Malanima, L’economia italiana. Dalla crescita medievale alla crescita contemporanea, Bologna 
2002, p. 450; idem, Urbanisation and the Italian Economy during the Last Millennium, “European Review of 
Economic History” IX (2005) 1, pp. 97-122.
Spain at the same date, after adjustment for agro-towns, had a substantially 
lower urbanisation ratio of 9 percent and correspondingly smaller per capita 
GDP  of  $1,050  (Table  1);  just  60  percent  that  of  Italy.  England  was  less 
commercially developed and urbanised than either, with only 5 percent of its 
population in towns of at least 5,000 inhabitants and a lower per capita GDP 
36  A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, 
Cambridge 2006, p. 243.
37  P. Bairoch, J. Batou, P. Chevre, op.cit., p. 289. 
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of $750 (less than half that of Italy) (Table 1). According to Bairoch, Batou 
and Chevre, urbanisation ratios were lower still in much of east-central and 
northern Europe, as, presumably, was per capita GDP38. Maybe in the poorest 
and least populous of these commercially most peripheral economies per 
capita GDP was as low as the $500-600 that Maddison took to be the norm 
almost  everywhere  in  Europe  at  this  date  (and  the  level  prevailing  in  the 
poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa today)39. If so, estimated urbanisation 
ratios imply that at the close of the 13th century the per capita GDP of virtually 
all European countries lay in the range $500 to $1,700 (Table 1). By 1850 the 
latt er had shifted upwards to $750 to $2,350 and the economic fortunes of 
some individual countries had changed even more dramatically.
DECLINE, STAGNATION, STABILITY AND GROWTH: THE EXPERIENCE 
OF LATE-MEDIEVAL ITALY, SPAIN, ENGLAND AND HOLLAND
By 1300 England, Spain, Flanders and Italy were all at diﬀ erent stages of 
economic  development  (Table  1),  as  refl ected  by  per  capita  GDPs  which 
ranged  from  a  minimum  of  $750  in  England  to  a  maximum  of  at  least 
$1,650 in Italy and corresponding urbanisation ratios in the range 5 percent 
(England) to 21 percent (the centre and north of Italy) and maybe 30 percent 
(Flanders). The leading economies of Italy and Flanders (whose per capita 
GDP can scarcely have been less than that of Italy) had risen to European 
commercial prominence during the 12th and 13th centuries when they became 
increasingly involved in international trade and developed their substantial 
manufacturing  and  service  sectors.  Both  were  exceptionally  densely 
populated to the extent that morcellation of holdings and rural congestion 
were signifi cant problems. The opposite was the case in the lagging economy 
of Spain, whose energies for much of the 12th and 13th centuries had been 
absorbed  in  the  Christian  re-colonisation  of  land  re-conquered  from  the 
Moors. Here, under-population hampered fuller development of economic 
forces and kept wealth and urbanisation levels well below those prevailing 
in Italy40. 
England  was  not  thus  disadvantaged.  Rather,  its  merchants  and 
manufacturers had failed to achieve the dominant position acquired by the 
Italians and Flemings with the result that, notwithstanding centuries of active 
commercialisation, its secondary and tertiary sectors remained circumscribed 
38  Ibidem, pp. 258-259.
39  A.  Maddison,  Statistics  on  World  Population,  GDP  and  per  capita  GDP  1-2008  A.D., 
Groningen, htt p://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm.
40  C. Álvarez-Nogal, L. Prados de la Escosura, The Rise and Fall of Spain (1270-1850), 
“Economic History Review” LXVI (2013) 1, pp. 1-37.
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in scale. Two centuries of strong population growth in combination with lax 
tenurial regulation of access to land and limited opportunities for making 
a livelihood outside agriculture meant that rural congestion and concomitant 
structural  poverty  were  mounting  problems41.  From  at  least  the  mid 
13th century, its increasingly bott om heavy socio-economic structure, in which 
70 percent of households received only 40 percent of income and occupied 
barely  a  third  of  all  arable  land,  was  exerting  downward  pressure  upon 
real  wage  rates  and  per  capita  GDP,  depressing  mass  demand,  polarising 
consumption patt erns and thwarting further urbanisation42. The upshot was 
that England remained signifi cantly less developed and poorer than either 
Flanders or Italy.
From  the  1290s,  onset  of  a  deepening  and  ultimately  self-reinforcing 
international commercial recession terminated the long economic expansion 
of the 12th and 13th centuries and hit the wealthier and commercially more 
dependent of these economies hardest as a series of reverse multiplier eﬀ ects 
was set in train. Malanima’s estimates indicate that per capita GDP in the more 
developed centre and north of Italy shrank by 15 percent (at -0.46 percent per 
annum) between 1310 and the mid 1340s, while the real wage rates of urban 
building workers declined by 25 percent (Graph 7). The consequent implosion 
of Italian domestic demand compounded the loss of overseas markets and 
rising transaction costs of overseas trade. Flanders suﬀ ered similarly and 
from the 1310s output of its important textile industry shrank signifi cantly, 
with consequences for per capita GDP and real wage rates which have yet 
to be quantifi ed43. Spain, far less dependent upon overseas trade, was less 
adversely aﬀ ected and the relative scarcity of labour prevented real wage 
rates from declining. Here, real wage rates att ained a temporal peak during 
the decades immediately prior to the Black Death (Graph 6). 
Waged labour was signifi cantly cheaper in England (Graph 3), whose 
labour market was glutt ed by an over-supply of workers. Yet neither English 
real  wage  rates  nor  per  capita  GDP  displayed  a  downward  trajectory 
comparable  to  that  of  once  thriving  Italy  (Graph  8).  With  no  surviving 
export  industries  of  consequence,  it  was  less  vulnerable  to  the  worsening 
international commercial situation and, paradoxically, as overseas textile 
producers switched from low- to high-value cloths bett er able to withstand 
41  B.M.S.  Campbell,  The  Agrarian  Problem  in  the  Early  Fourteenth  Century,  “Past  and 
Present” CLXXXVIII (2005), pp. 3-70. 
42  B.M.S.  Campbell,  Benchmarking  Medieval  Economic  Development:  England,  Wales, 
Scotland, and Ireland circa 1290, “Economic History Review” LXI (2008) 4, p. 940.
43  J.H. Munro, Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades, c. 1290 
- c. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?, in: Before the Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ 
of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. by B.M.S. Campbell, Manchester 1991, pp. 110-148.
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rising freight and other transaction costs, demand for English wool remained 
buoyant44. Cheap labour also sustained high levels of tin output, of whose 
supply the country eﬀ ectively enjoyed an international monopoly45. Early 
14th century England may have been the least wealthy of these four countries 
but  the  relative  stability  of  both  real  wage  rates  and  per  capita  GDP 
independently  estimated  indicate  that,  short-term  crises  apart,  it  was  not 
becoming signifi cantly poorer.
Graph 6: Spain: population, real wage rates, and per capita GDP, 1300-1850.
Sources: data supplied by L. Prados de la Escosura.
Understandably, these diﬀ erently circumstanced economies responded 
in quite diﬀ erent ways to the massive negative demographic shock infl icted 
by the Black Death of 1347-1353 and successor pandemics of the 1360s and 
1370s. For sparsely populated Spain the dramatic reduction in numbers was 
a serious setback, since labour became so scarce that established levels of 
productivity proved diﬃ  cult to sustain. C. Álvarez-Nogal and L. Prados de 
la Escosura believe that Spanish per capita GDP declined by approximately 
one-fi fth following the plagues to less than $800 during the fi nal quarter 
of the 14th century and did not regain its pre Black Death level until the 
closing decades of the 16th century, when the country had emerged as an 
imperial and colonial power of the fi rst importance (Graph 6). Signifi cantly, 
although mid 15th century Spanish real wage rates eclipsed those of the era 
44  E.M. Carus-Wilson, O. Coleman, England’s Export Trade, 1275-1547, Oxford 1963.
45  J. Hatcher, English Tin Production and Trade before 1550, Oxford 1973.
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of  vigorous  frontier  colonisation  before  the  Black  Death,  per  capita  GDP 
remained stubbornly below the earlier peak level due to the ongoing problem 
of under population (Table 5). It remains to be seen whether similar trends 
prevailed  in  Europe’s  other  thinly  peopled  regions  where  heavy  plague 
mortality  may  have  had  equally  adverse  economic  consequences,  lowering 
populations, shrinking market demand and limiting specialisation. Certainly, 
Spain’s problems appear modest when compared with those experienced 
by Ireland46.
Table 5: Per capita GDP versus labourers’ real wage rates, Spain, Italy, England and 
Holland 1300-1349 to 1400-1449.
Spain Italy England Holland
Per 
capita 
GDP
Real 
wage 
rate
Per 
capita 
GDP
Real 
wage 
rate
Per 
capita 
GDP
Real 
wage 
rate
Per 
capita 
GDP
Real 
wage 
rate
1300-
-1349
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1400-
-1449
90 123 103 169 169 230 c. 142 n.d.
Sources: Spain: data supplied by L. Prados de la Escosura; Italy: P. Malanima, Italian GDP 1300-1913, 
Institute  of  Studies  on  Mediterranean  Societies,  Italian  National  Research  Council  (N.D.);  G.  Federico, 
P. Malanima, Progress, Decline, Growth: Product and Productivity in Italian Agriculture, 1000-2000, “Economic 
History  Review”  LVII  (2004)  3,  pp.  459-460;  England  and  Holland:  S.N.  Broadberry,  B.M.S.  Campbell, 
M. Overton, J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National Incomes of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 
1850, research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Reference Number F/00215AR (N.D.).
The  response  in  Italy  refl ected  its  signifi cantly  greater  density  of 
population.  Following  the  devastating  impact  of  plague  upon  its  crowded 
and  urbanised  population,  it  still  supported  an  average  density  of  25  per 
square kilometre, reduced from 40 per square kilometre at the opening of the 
14th century, when peak rural population densities reached and sometimes 
exceeded 75 per square kilometre. Where rural congestion was so great, loss 
of numbers was more a boon than a misfortune and Malanima’s estimates 
of real wage rates and per capita GDP indicate that, after a hiatus during 
the  third  quarter  of  the  14th  century  as  successive  waves  of  plague  struck 
the peninsula, both rose (Graph 7). Yet, whereas the mean gain in per capita 
GDP between the fi rst half of the 14th and fi rst half of the 15th centuries was 
a mere 3 percent, the improvement in urban and rural labourers’ real wage 
rates was almost 70 percent (Table 3). 
46  A New History of Ireland, II: Medieval Ireland 1169-1534, ed. by A. Cosgrove, Oxford 
2008.
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In Italy the return to per capita GDP growth that eventually followed the 
successive plagues of 1347-1375 was the product of contraction rather than 
expansion, as the shrinkage of national income lagged behind the ongoing 
contraction  of  population.  Nor,  tellingly,  was  there  any  accompanying 
improvement  in  the  urbanisation  ratio,  for  Italian  overseas  trade  and 
commerce were in retreat. The once lucrative Italian-controlled trans-Eurasian 
trade had shrunk to a heavily tolled trickle, merchants were more risk averse 
than formerly so that local orbits of exchange were now the mainstay of 
most mercantile activity, and, with smaller populations to supply, markets 
were  less  integrated47.  Without  reinvigorated  commercial  expansion  to 
underpin it, the renewal of Italian population growth during the second 
half of the 15th century consequently exerted negative pressure upon both 
real wage rates and per capita GDP while the country’s urbanisation ratio 
resumed  its  inexorable  decline  (Graph  7).  In  Italy’s  case  the  post-plague 
windfall economic gains lacked durability and withered once the exceptional 
demographic circumstances responsible for them had passed. Insofar as this 
was growth, it was of a decidedly insubstantial and transitory nature.
47  B.Z. Kedar, Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Aﬀ airs and the Fourteenth-
-century Depression, New Haven-London 1976; V.N. Bateman, op.cit., p. 464.
Graph 7: Italy: population, real wage rates, and per capita GDP, 1300-1850.
Sources: P. Malanima, Italian GDP 1300-1913, Institute of Studies on Mediterranean Societies, Italian 
National  Research  Council  (N.D.);  G.  Federico,  P.  Malanima,  Progress,  Decline,  Growth:  Product  and 
Productivity in Italian Agriculture, 1000-2000, “Economic History Review” LVII (2004) 3, pp. 459-460.
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England, by far the less-developed country, fared decidedly bett er. 
As in Italy, per capita GDP and real wage rates both benefi ted from the 
mortality-induced elimination of excess population but unlike Italy these 
gains were felt immediately following the fi rst pandemic of 1348-1349 and 
continued to accrue thereafter as the productivity of those who survived the 
plagues steadily improved and the burden of structural poverty eﬀ ectively 
disappeared (Graph 8). They were also on a proportionately greater 
scale. From $700-800 before the Black Death, English per capita GDP had 
risen  by  a  third  to  $1,000-$1,200  by  the  early  15th  century;  the  concurrent 
improvement  in  real  wage  rates  was  even  greater,  more  than  doubling 
(Table 3). Nevertheless, in accordance with the intrinsically negative character 
of the prevailing economic dynamic, these substantial gains in per capita GDP 
and labourers’ real wage rates failed to translate into any improvement in 
the urbanisation ratio. This was diﬀ erential contraction rather than demand 
generated growth and most gains in per capita consumption benefi ted rural 
producers and craftsmen rather than urban artisans and traders.
Graph 8: England: population, real wage rates, and per capita GDP, 1250-1850.
Sources: S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, M. Overton, J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National 
Incomes of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 1850, research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 
Reference Number F/00215AR (N.D.); Graph 2.
England’s post-plague per capita GDP gains also proved more durable 
than  those  achieved  in  Italy,  insofar  as  they  endured  without  signifi cant 
erosion  for  the  next  250  years.  During  the  16th  century  London  started  to 
grow vigorously and the urbanisation ratio to rise as the country’s economic 
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structure began to change with the slow but steady expansion of both the 
manufacturing and service sectors48. It was these structural developments 
that enabled per capita GDP gains accrued during an era of demographic 
decline  to  survive  into  the  ensuing  era  of  population  growth  (Graph  8). 
Although real wage rates trended down again (Graphs 1 and 2), as labour 
declined  in  relative  value  and  the  working  year  lengthened  as  labourers 
worked  more  industriously  in  order  to  maintain  household  incomes 
(Graph 9), with certain notable short-term exceptions, per capita GDP did 
not. A new dynamic equilibrium had been achieved as the economy entered 
a  commercially  more  expansive  phase  and  latent  processes  of  Smithian 
growth  gathered  momentum  that  would  deliver  further  signifi cant  gains 
in per capita GDP from the late 17th century so that by 1700 English per 
capita GDP fi nally breached the $1,500 ceiling and overtook that of the now 
ailing Italian economy49.
48  E.A.  Wrigley,  Urban  Growth  and  Agricultural  Change:  England  and  the  Continent…, 
pp. 683-728; S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, B. van Leeuwen, op.cit., pp. 16-27.
49  English  real  wage  rates  likewise  overtook  those  of  Italy  between  1670  and  1730: 
P. Malanima, When Did England Overtake Italy? Medieval and Early Modern Divergence in Prices 
and Wages, “European Review of Economic History” XVII (2013) 1, pp. 45-70.
Graph 9: England: annual number of days’ work required by waged labourers to 
meet the subsistence needs of their households.
Sources:  R.C.  Allen,  J.L.  Weisdorf,  Was  There  an  ‘Industrious  Revolution’  before  the  Industrial  Revolution? 
An Empirical Exercise for England, c. 1300-1830, “Economic History Review” LXIV (2011) 3, pp. 715-729, 
data supplied by J.L. Weisdorf.
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Table 6: Welfare ratios (earnings relative to poverty line) of urban building labourers 
for nine European cities, 1450s and 1590s.
City Welfare ratio 
1450s
City Welfare ratio 
1590s
Antwerp 1.57 Antwerp 1.34
Amsterdam 1.20
London 1.54 London 1.01
Valencia 1.53 Valencia 0.87
Naples 0.78
Vienna 1.51 Vienna 0.70
Paris 1.26 Paris 0.65
Florence 1.32 Florence 0.61
Strasbourg 1.36 Strasbourg 0.59
Source: R.C. Allen,The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World 
War, “Explorations in Economic History” XXXVIII (2001) 4, pp. 411-447; idem, Data: Wages and Price History, 
htt p://www.nuﬃ  eld.ox.ac.uk/People/sites/Allen/SitePages/Biography.aspx (N.D.).
England’s ability to hang onto most of its post-plague gains in per capita 
GDP was evidently unusual to judge from the fact that the wage rates of 
London building labourers would still just about purchase a “respectability 
basket  of  consumables”  at  the  close  of  the  16th  century,  whereas  those 
of  building  labourers  in  most  other  European  cities  had  ceased  to  do  so 
(Table  6).  According  to  Allen’s  calculations,  the  purchasing  power  of 
Parisian, Florentine and Strasbourgian workers had at least halved between 
the 1450s, when real wage rates everywhere were at their peak, and the 
1590s. Most resilient of all were the real wage rates of building workers 
in the southern North Sea entrepôts of Antwerp and Amsterdam, the latt er 
situated within a small and advantageously located region whose economy 
had displayed increasing vitality from early in the 15th century and by the 
mid 16th century had overtaken Italy in the purchasing power of its wage 
rates and per capita GDP50.
Late-medieval Flanders, Brabant and Holland are all tantalisingly less well 
documented and fully researched than their English neighbour immediately 
across the North Sea. For Holland alone quantifi able data are suﬃ  cient to 
allow a tentative output-based reconstruction of national income and per 
capita GDP from 1348 until 1500, when the range and quality of available 
data lend more confi dence to the estimates (Graph 10). Initially, following 
the Black Death, per capita GDP developments in Holland look very much 
50  B. van Bavel, J.-L. van Zanden, The Jump Start of the Holland Economy during the Late 
Medieval  Crisis,  c.  1350  -  c.  1500,  “Economic  History  Review”  LVII  (2004)  3,  pp.  503-532; 
J.L. van Zanden, B. van Leeuwen, op.cit., pp. 119-130.
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like those in England, with the diﬀ erence that Dutch per capita GDP was 
marginally higher, varying within the range $1,000 to $1,400 throughout the 
second half of the 14th century. In an age of contraction, the province’s small 
size was an advantage: with a population of around 0.2 million (compared 
with England’s 2.5 million in 1377), its national income was roughly one tenth 
that of England. It possessed an excellent network of navigable waterways 
and canals, was blessed with abundant supplies of peat for fuel and clay for 
brick and tile manufacture, and was strategically well placed to profi t from 
the established maritime commerce of the North Sea and new opportunities 
for fi shing and trade opening in the North Atlantic. In the late 14th and early 
15th  centuries  shrinking  peat  and  rising  water  tables  presented  a  major 
ecological  setback,  displacing  population  from  the  land,  obliging  farmers 
to  switch  from  arable  to  pastoral  production,  defl ecting  investment  into 
fi shing  and  shipping,  and  begett ing  a  dependence  upon  imported  grain 
supplies51. Confronted by these environmental challenges, Dutch per capita 
GDP suﬀ ered a modest decline between 1390 and 1430, by which date it was 
more-or-less on a par with that of England. 
Graph 10: Holland: population, real wage rates, and per capita GDP, 1350-1800.
Sources: S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, M. Overton, J.-L. van Zanden, Reconstructing the National Incomes 
of Britain and Holland, c. 1270/1500 to 1850, research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Reference 
Number F/00215AR (N.D.); R.C. Allen, The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages 
to the First World War, “Explorations in Economic History” XXXVIII (2001) 4, pp. 411-447; idem, Data: Wages 
and Price History, htt p://www.nuﬃ  eld.ox.ac.uk/People/sites/Allen/SitePages/Biography.aspx (N.D.).
51  B. van Bavel, J.-L. van Zanden, op.cit., pp. 503-532.
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From the 1430s, however, the Dutch economy (probably in parallel with 
that  of  Brabant  immediately  to  the  south,  whose  capital,  Antwerp,  was 
fl ourishing) appears to have entered a new growth phase and started to 
forge ahead of its neighbours. From this time shipping, fi shing, dairying, 
brewing, textile manufacture, brick and tile making and peat digging all grew 
in economic signifi cance. Sustained by favourable marketing institutions, 
well-defi ned property rights and migration from the countryside, towns 
prospered,  so  much  so  that  by  1500  the  urbanisation  ratio  had  reached 
almost 30 percent. Concurrently, per capita GDP had recovered and risen 
to $1,480 at a modest average annual growth rate between the 1420s and 
1500s of 0.24 percent per annum. Given that the population was also rising, 
urbanisation increasing, commerce expanding, the structure of the economy 
changing, and technology advancing, this was real growth and, as such, 
almost unique in Europe at the time. It laid the foundation for rapid take 
oﬀ  of the Dutch economy in the following century as population growth 
accelerated to 0.61 percent a year and per capita GDP growth doubled to an 
average of 0.47 percent, thereby elevating per capita GDP to almost $2,500 
by the close of the 16th century (Graph 10). No European country had ever 
been as wealthy. Only real wage rates ran counter to this growth trend 
Table 3): by 1600 an Amsterdam building labourer’s wage rate purchased 
24 percent less than in 1500 and 40 percent less than in the second quarter 
of the 15th century (Graphs 3 and 10).
Meanwhile, during the 16th century per capita GDP of imperial and 
colonial Spain grew by less than 0.1 percent, that of England displayed 
zero growth, and that of the once leading economy of Italy (overtaken by 
Holland in the 1520s) shrank by -0.27% per annum (Graphs 6, 7 and 8). All 
were maritime nations as exposed as Holland to the revival of European 
commerce, establishment of a North Atlantic economy, and establishment of 
direct maritime links with India and the Far East. None, however, enjoyed 
Holland’s early start, or was as open to, and derived as large a share of 
national income from (in Holland’s case, a third of the total), overseas trade. 
Golden Age Holland thus exemplifi es the Smithian gains from trade that 
could be reaped by a small and advantageously located region, endowed 
with good riverine and maritime communications and cheap and abundant 
fuel, and with property rights and institutions which promoted and rewarded 
economic enterprise. In these respects, its success both resembled and 
exceeded that of Italy and Flanders during the 12th and 13th centuries and 
anticipated that achieved by England from the late 17th century.
GROWTH AND THE ILLUSION OF GROWTH IN LATE-MEDIEVAL EUROPE
Recent reconstructions by a variety of direct and indirect methods of the 
national incomes of a handful of European countries have yielded a number 
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of valuable insights and revisions respecting economic growth or the want 
of it during the pre-industrial centuries. Absolute estimates of per capita 
GDP  emerge  as  signifi cantly  higher  than  those  originally  proposed  by 
Maddison. Relatively under-developed agrarian economies dominated by 
primary production with limited manufacturing sectors and low urbanisation 
ratios, such as early 14th century England and late 16th century Sweden, had 
per capita GDPs of around $750-$850. Although materially anything but 
rich, their food, drink and clothing were relatively costly to produce, which 
boosted per capita GDP above the bare-bones minimum of $1 a day. During 
more prosperous times, when demographic pressures were in abeyance, these 
economies were capable of sustaining a per capita GDP of around $1,000, 
whereby a substantial majority of households were able enjoy a respectability 
level of subsistence (Tables 1 and 6). Higher levels of per capita GDP of 
$1,500 or greater, such as those att ained by Italy and probably Flanders 
in the 13th century, Holland in the 16th century and England from the mid 
17th century, required fuller development of value-added activities. These, 
therefore, were economies with developed secondary and tertiary sectors. 
Necessarily, they were also underpinned by impressive levels of agricultural 
productivity. All were actively involved in overseas trade, which made 
a signifi cant contribution to national income and promoted high and rising 
urbanisation ratios. The most successful and dynamic of these advanced pre-
industrial economies – Golden Age Holland and early industrial England – 
sometimes achieved a per capita GDP of $2,000-$2,500 (Table 1). Such wealth 
was, however, quite exceptional and came quite late in the growth process. 
Most societies had to be content with much less.
Gains in per capita GDP over time were generally modest and episodic 
and many European economies were litt le wealthier in the late 18th century 
than  they  had  been  fi ve  centuries  earlier.  Italy,  whose  per  capita  GDP 
declined from $1,650 in 1300 to $1,010 in 1800, was actually poorer (Graph 7). 
The magnitude of its decline refl ected the scope for contraction provided by 
its precocious early development. Few, if any, economies fared as badly, for 
the general Western European trend was towards slowly increasing per capita 
GDP over time. If English per capita GDP in 1300 of around $700-$800 was 
close to the European median and the average per capita GDP of 30 Western 
European countries in 1850 was approximately $1,570, per capita GDP 
roughly doubled across these fi ve centuries at an average annual growth rate 
of 0.15 percent. A small and quite exceptional group of economies achieved 
higher  rates  of  growth  and  successfully  trebled  their  per  capita  national 
incomes over this same period. Holland belonged to this elite group and 
during the fi nal quarter of the 16th century when its economy was developing 
most rapidly it briefl y sustained an annual growth rate of 1.2 percent. Such 
rapid growth was quite exceptional. The maximum that England achieved 
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prior to its industrial revolution was 0.78 percent during the fi nal quarter 
of the 17th century. “Fast” growth by pre-industrial standards was therefore 
anything in excess of 0.25 percent per annum and was usually contingent 
upon slow population growth. Even at this rate it would have taken almost 
300 years for per capita GDP to double. Any economy that achieved this was 
therefore doing exceptionally well. 
The chronology of economic development revealed by trends in per capita 
GDP is diﬀ erent from that implied by labourers’ real wage rates and, with the 
notable exception of the 100 years following the Black Death, more consistent 
with that suggested by urbanisation ratios. In both England and Italy real 
wage rates display a strong inverse correlation with population (Graphs 4 
and 5), primarily because of the infl uence of population size upon relative 
factor prices and, in turn, the number of days it was necessary for labourers 
to work in order to satisfy their families’ subsistence requirements (Graph 9). 
Real wage rates consequently lend themselves to a pessimistic Malthusian 
interpretation of pre-industrial development, whereby population growth 
was typically at the expense of per capita incomes, which only rose when 
growth ceased or was reversed. Trends in per capita GDP provide grounds 
for greater optimism since they tended to hold up bett er during periods 
of population growth and were less prone to infl ation when populations 
declined (Graphs 6, 7, 8 and 9). They also bett er encapsulate the totality of 
economic activity and consequently are a surer guide to the pace and direction 
of economic change. A good example is the downturn of Amsterdam building 
labourers’  real  wage  rates  between  1450  and  1600  at  a  time  when  rising 
population, urbanisation, export earnings and per capita GDP indicate that 
real economic change and growth were taking place (Table 3).
It might be tempting to argue that the divergent trajectories between per 
capita GDP and labourers’ real wage rates are in part at least an artefact of 
the methods of employed in estimating the former. Angeles, however, has 
provided  a  convincing  economic  explanation  of  why  genuine  deviations 
between the two are to be expected in terms of relative factor prices and per 
capita labour supply52. He demonstrates that this is why English per capita 
GDP rose but real wage rates fell after 1750, as the working year lengthened 
and per capita labour supply increased, and his explanation would appear 
to fi t the concurrent divergences that occurred in Holland, Italy and Spain. 
Replication of this patt ern in all four independently constructed chronologies 
lends confi dence to the credibility of both the chronologies and the trend. 
Much the same applies to the divergence between real wage rates and per 
capita GDP that followed the Black Death, for this shows up in Italy, England, 
and Spain (where wage rates rose but per capita GDP actually fell), and is 
52  L. Angeles, op.cit., pp. 147-163.
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implicit in the high real wage rates of mid 15th century Holland (Graphs 6, 
7, 8 and 10). Such a recurrent patt ern is unlikely to be an artefact of the time 
series and is undoubtedly to be explained by a European-wide rise in the price 
of labour relative to land and capital, reinforced by a per capita reduction in 
labour supply as higher wage rates enabled labourers to work less. 
This chimes with Allen and Weisdorf’s analysis of the number of days 
per year that English urban and rural labourers needed to work in order 
to provide their households with a respectability basket of consumables, 
which they estimate declined to less than three days a week during the real 
wage-rate peak of the mid 15th century (Graph 9)53. As they point out, this 
gave manual labourers the option of enjoying more leisure or working more 
industriously in order to acquire more consumables54. A strong preference 
for the former is suggested by the fact that, as S.H. Rigby has observed, there 
was no corresponding rise in the urbanisation ratio55. Contrary to Wrigley’s 
dictum, during this period a rising level of real income per head did not 
translate  into  a  rising  proportion  of  urban  dwellers,  and  to  judge  from 
Bairoch, Batou and Chevre’s national estimates of urbanisation, this seems 
to have been repeated to varying degrees right across Europe56. Diﬀ erences 
did nevertheless exist in the magnitude of the divergence between real wage 
rates  and  per  capita  GDP  (which  was  far  greater  in  Italy  than  Spain  and 
greater still in England), mainly because of diﬀ erences in the relative price 
of labour on the eve of the Black Death (which was highest in labour-scarce 
Spain and lowest in labour-surfeited England) (Table 5 and Graph 3).
The  gains  in  per  capita  GDP  that  occurred  during  the  pre-industrial 
centuries arose either for the negative reason that population was shrinking 
faster than national income, or the positive reason that economic output 
was expanding faster than population. A rise in the urbanisation ratio, often 
driven by emergence of a single major metropolis or cluster of great cities, was 
typically characteristic of the positive, but not the negative, scenario. It was 
53  I. Blanchard (op.cit., p. 17) estimated that peasant families spent 125-135 days a year on 
farm work “leaving them 130-140 days of ‘dead time’ [...] free from the agricultural round”.
54  R.C. Allen, J.L. Weisdorf, op.cit.: leisure time comprised approximately 100 holy days 
ordained by the Church and up to 140 days available for popular recreations: I. Blanchard, 
op.cit.,  pp.  19-23.  For  the  array  of  leisure  pursuits  cheaply  or  freely  available  to  ordinary 
people see C. Reeves, Pleasures and Pastimes in Medieval England, Stroud 1995.
55  S.H. Rigby, Urban Population in Late Medieval England: the Evidence of the Lay Subsidies, 
“Economic History Review” LXIII (2010) 2, p. 411: “the share of England’s population living 
in its provincial towns in 1524 was, at most, no higher than that in 1377 and may even have 
been slightly lower”.
56  E.A.  Wrigley,  Urban  Growth  and  Agricultural  Change:  England  and  the  Continent…, 
pp. 683-728; P. Bairoch, J. Batou, P. Chevre, op.cit., p. 259: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Italy, Switz erland, Austria, Hungary and the Czech lands, the Balkans and European Russia 
all had lower urbanisation ratios in 1500 than 1400, while Romania’s remained unchanged.
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symptomatic of the leading role played by expanding trade and commerce 
in promoting productivity improvements via greater specialisation, fuller 
market  integration,  adoption  of  more  eﬃ  cient  institutions,  technological 
innovation, and more intensive use of available resources. Positive growth 
of this sort is exemplifi ed by Italy during its commercial revolution, Holland 
during its golden age, and England during the mercantilist prelude to its 
industrial revolution (Tables 2, 3 and 4). 
Such  conditions  scarcely  applied  during  the  100  years  that  followed 
the Black Death, when Europe was in the grip of a deepening commercial 
recession, urban hinterlands were shrinking and markets becoming less 
integrated57. Thinly peopled Spain is unlikely to have been alone in sustaining 
a  reduction  of  per  capita  GDP  in  the  wake  of  the  plague  as  depopulation 
rendered  established  levels  of  productivity  unsustainable:  its  experience 
cautions against returning an overly optimistic verdict upon this unusual 
period.  Tellingly,  even  when  real  wage  rates  and  per  capita  GDP  both 
improved, as in the case of both Italy and England, this failed to translate 
into higher urbanisation ratios, as should have been the case if this was 
economic growth in a conventional Kutz netsian sense. Moreover, in most of 
Europe the improved real wage rates and per capita GDP gains of the post-
-plague era proved transitory and endured no longer than the exceptional 
demographic  circumstances  responsible  for  them.  The  exceptions  were 
a  group  of  regions  around  the  southern  North  Sea  –  Flanders,  Brabant, 
Holland and England – all advantageously located, small in scale, well 
endowed with cheap energy, and blessed with favourable institutions. Here, 
post Black Death gains in per capita GDP were successfully maintained into 
the ensuing era of renewed population growth and commercial expansion, 
when, fi rst Flanders, then Brabant, Holland and fi nally England, built upon 
them (Graphs 8 and 10)58.
Historical national income analysis is in its infancy. The number of case 
studies is small and biased towards countries – Italy, Holland and England 
– which at one time or another were in the van of European economic 
development. Application of the method is contingent upon both survival of 
relevant historical records and the current state of historical knowledge, in 
terms of available quantifi able information on key areas of economic activity. 
All of the national income reconstructions presented and discussed in this 
paper will in due course require revision, as further research is undertaken 
and fuller and more precise data become available. Scholarly criticism of 
57  B.Z.  Kedar,  op.cit.;  B.M.S.  Campbell,  English  Seigniorial  Agriculture  1250-1450, 
Cambridge 2000, pp. 430-436; V.N. Bateman, op.cit., p. 464.
58  J.L.  van  Zanden,  B.  van  Leeuwen,  op.cit.,  pp.  119-130;  S.N.  Broadberry, 
B.M.S. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton, B. van Leeuwen, op.cit.
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data, methods and results is to be expected59. In their methods and results, 
each, nevertheless, provides a cross-check on the others, hence extension of 
the approach to additional countries and regions can only refi ne and increase 
confi dence in the results and place each country’s experience in a clearer 
economic context. Although many historians may be uncomfortable with 
such a macro scale of analysis and the challenges this poses and questions it 
begs, it has the great merits of highlighting historiographic inconsistencies and 
oversights and generating results which facilitate a genuinely comparative 
approach to historical analysis of economic development both within and 
beyond  Europe.  Key  topics  that  invite  closer  investigation  include  the 
economic  multiplier  eﬀ ects  of  Western  Europe’s  prevailing  mixed-farming 
agricultural systems, impact of the Black Death upon per capita output in 
relatively sparsely populated regions, the forms taken by the strong leisure 
preference of late-medieval wage labourers, the extent of changes over time 
in the length of the working day and year, the ability of waged labourers 
to secure regular full-time employment, the labour-force participation rates 
of men, women and children, and whether the wage rates paid to causal 
labourers are representative of those received by those on annual contracts60. 
Historical national income analysis is therefore as valuable for the historical 
questions it raises, as for the answers it is beginning to provide. 
ABSTRACT
Pessimistic Malthusian verdicts on the capacity of pre-industrial European economies 
to sustain a degree of real economic growth under conditions of population growth are 
challenged using current reconstructions of urbanisation ratios, the real wage rates of building 
and agricultural labourers, and GDP per capita estimated by a range of methods. Economic 
growth is shown to have outpaced population growth and raised GDP per capita to in excess 
of $1,500 (1990 $ international at PPP) in Italy during its 12th and 13th century commercial 
revolution, Holland during its 15th and 16th century golden age, and England during the 17th 
and 18th century runup to its industrial revolution. During each of these Smithian growth 
episodes expanding trade and commerce sustained signifi cant output and employment growth 
in the manufacturing and service sectors. These positive developments were not necessarily 
refl ected by trends in real wage rates for the latt er were powerfully infl uenced by associated 
changes in relative factor prices and the per capita supply of labour as workers varied the 
length of the working year in order to consume either more leisure or more goods. The scale 
of the divergence between trends in real wage rates and GDP per capita nevertheless varied 
a great deal between countries for reasons which have yet to be adequately explained.
59  Witness the contrasting estimates of S.N. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, B. van Leeuwen, 
op.cit.,  pp.  16-27  and  G.  Clark,  1381  and  the  Malthus  Delusion,  “Explorations  in  Economic 
History”  L  (2013)  1,  pp.  4-15  as  reviewed  by  T.  Leunig,  Understanding  the  English  Economy 
1381-1869: Editor’s Introduction, “Explorations in Economic History” L (2013) 1, pp. 1-3.
60  J. Hatcher, Unreal Real Wages: How “Golden” Was the Fifteenth Century?, in: Commercial 
Activity,  Markets  and  Entrepreneurs  in  the  Middle  Ages:  Essays  in  Honour  of  Richard  Britnell, 
ed. by B. Dodds, C.D. Liddy, Woodbridge 2011, pp. 1-24.
